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Yen-dollar fluctuations increase macroeconomic instability in small economies in East Asia. I 
investigate the choice of an exchange rate regime for these countries so as to minimize the 
adverse effects of this volatility. I build a sticky-price dynamic model of a small economy whose 
trade is invoiced in dollar and yen. First, I show the conditions under which pegging to a trade-
weighted basket of the two currencies is the optimal policy for the small economy. Then, I 
introduce net worth constraints and unhedged dollar borrowing which pull the optimal policy 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the world’s three major 
currencies have fluctuated widely against one another. Figure 1 illustrates the tremendous volatility in the 
euro-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates since the 1970s.
2 Given that the United States, the Euro Area, and 
Japan are very large and fairly closed economies with sophisticated financial markets, they are largely 
immune to sharp fluctuations in the external values of their monies. In contrast, in developing small open 
economies with imperfect and incomplete financial markets the exchange rate is probably the single most 
important price in the entire economy. Many small open economies have chosen to peg to one of the world’s 
major currencies, typically the one which dominates their trade and financial flows. By pegging to a single 
currency, those developing countries with a more diversified direction of trade and finance have exposed 
themselves to fluctuations against all the other major currencies. This has brought sharp fluctuations in their 
effective exchange rates and has led to increased macroeconomic instability. 
Recent attention to this issue has been scant. Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) have noted that there is a 
trade-off between G-3 exchange rate volatility, on the one hand, and G-3 interest rate and spending volatility, 
on the other. All three factors matter for business cycles in the developing world. The authors also find that 
during periods of high G-3 exchange rate volatility and low US interest rate volatility we tend to witness more 
crises in emerging economies. Esquivel and Larrain (2002) question the trade-off between G-3 exchange rate 
and interest rate volatility. They estimate that G-3 exchange rate volatility decreases the real exports of 
developing countries by about 2% on average, and by 3% in East Asia. Furthermore, G-3 currency instability 
increases the probability of an exchange rate crisis in emerging economies by about 2.5%. It also reduces FDI 
into certain regions of the developing world (East Asia, for example). Finally, based on its own empirical 
models, IMF (2003) finds that the impact of G-3 exchange rate volatility on developing countries is small 
overall, but might be quite important for certain regions such as East Asia, due to pervasive liability 
dollarization.  
One can think of G-3 exchange rate volatility as a negative externality. It affects small open 
economies the same way the smoke from the factory chimney affects nearby farmers in the classical textbook 
example. The first-best solution would be to shut down the chimney – that is, restore stability to the relative 
values of the world’s major currencies, as was the case under the Bretton Woods system. This is beyond the 
reach of developing small open economies. Unfortunately, the issuers of the world’s major currencies do not 
seem particularly interested in such an arrangement. A second-best solution explored since the 1970s, both in 
practice and in theory, is to peg to a basket of currencies. This stabilizes a country’s effective exchange rate 
and smoothes the impact of instability in major currency exchange rates. The number of countries practicing 
                                                 
2 Before 1999, the euro-dollar exchange rate was spliced with the German mark-dollar rate. -3- 
currency basket arrangements peaked in the 1980s and has declined since then.
3 Theoretical models of the 
optimal currency basket proliferated in the early 1980s. Most of them were reduced-form real models, 
focusing on trade in goods and neglecting money and capital flows. Turnovsky (1982) is one exception: the 
paper offers a reduced-form general equilibrium model with capital mobility. 
While basket pegs have waxed and waned in academic and policy fashion, the problem they sought to 
redress has persisted. Small open economies continue to seek an external nominal anchor in a world where 
the major currencies fluctuate widely against one another. In a recent revival, the literature on basket pegs has 
focused on the small emerging economies in East Asia. By now, no stone has been left unturned in search of 
an explanation for the spectacular macroeconomic collapse five of them experienced in 1997. One popular 
theory has maintained that the crisis was precipitated by volatility in the yen-dollar exchange rate, coupled 
with de facto pegs to the dollar practiced by most of the crisis countries prior to 1997. A dollar peg meant that 
East Asian economies floated freely against the Japanese yen. Given the yen’s alleged importance in regional 
trade and finance, that led to increased macroeconomic instability. The sharp depreciation of the yen against 
the dollar after mid-1995 was particularly disruptive for the region, and is alleged to have triggered the crisis. 
There is general consensus on the positive issue: yen-dollar volatility has significantly affected 
emerging economies in East Asia. However, two strands of literature have emerged on the normative issue: 
what, then, is the optimal way for emerging East Asian economies to manage their currencies? Various 
authors – Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998), Williamson (2000), Kwan (2001), Kawai (2002) – have argued that 
the right lesson to draw from the 1997 crisis is that exchange rate policies in East Asia had focused too much 
on the dollar before 1997. These authors have argued that small East Asian economies ought to put a greater 
weight on the Japanese yen, given the extensive trade and financial linkages with Japan. A trade-weighted 
basket, in particular, has emerged as the most commonly advocated solution. Even more recently, a trade-
weighted basket peg has been recommended by many economists and government officials as the appropriate 
exchange rate regime for China. 
A shortcoming of all these analyses is that they typically focus on trade in goods and either neglect 
capital flows or assume complete and perfectly-functioning financial markets. As a result, they end up 
arguing in favor of a trade-weighted basket. On the contrary, in this paper I will argue that keying on the 
dollar was and remains the optimal exchange rate regime for emerging East Asian economies, not only 
because the bulk of their trade is invoiced in dollars, but also because most of their foreign debt is dollar-
denominated and because their financial markets are imperfect and incomplete. More generally, I will show 
that the choice of an exchange rate regime by small open economies facing volatility among the major 
currencies is complicated by unhedged foreign borrowing and net worth constraints. These frictions pull the 
                                                 
3 See Mussa et al (2000), p. 27. -4- 
optimal policy away from the trade-weighted basket, and toward putting a greater weight on the currency in 
which foreign debt is denominated. 
Section 2 of this paper takes a closer look at East Asia where the dollar competes with the yen. The 
main focus is on motivating the modeling assumptions employed later. Section 3 builds a dynamic sticky-
price model of a small open economy that trades with two large countries and is vulnerable to fluctuations in 
the exchange rate between the two. There are two versions of the model and the paper’s punchline hangs in 
the difference between the two. First, in Section 4 I show the conditions under which the optimal policy for a 
small open economy is to peg to a trade-weighted basket of the two large countries’ currencies. Then, in 
Section 5 I introduce credit market imperfections a la Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) and unhedged 
foreign borrowing, which pull the optimal policy away from the trade-weighted basket and toward placing a 
substantially higher weight on the currency of borrowing. The paper’s main result is that the currency 
structure of debt is quite important in deciding how to manage the exchange rate in response to fluctuations in 
G-3 exchange rates. Small East Asian economies should continue keying on the dollar, not only because the 
bulk of their trade is invoiced in dollars, but also because most of their foreign debt is dollar-denominated and 
unhedged. The paper’s chief methodological contribution is that it updates on older literature on the optimal 
currency basket which lacked explicit micro-foundations, and merges it with a current literature on credit 
market imperfections and balance sheet effects. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Building blocks 
This section discusses the building blocks for the model of Section 3, with special emphasis on the 
small economies in East Asia and their vulnerability to fluctuations in the yen-dollar exchange rate. 
 
2.1 The exchange rate regime and the currency structure of trade and debt 
Selecting the exchange rate regime and the currency structure of trade and debt is a joint exercise in 
optimal risk management by the private sector and by the government. Subject to certain constraints, the 
private sector chooses the currency structure for trade and debt. Over short horizons, governments choose the 
exchange rate regime with a view on maintaining competitiveness and/or providing the economy with a 
nominal anchor. Over longer horizons, governments of emerging markets subject to financial fragility and 
“original sin” often choose to maintain exchange rate stability in order to minimize payments risk and provide 
an informal hedge to the private sector (McKinnon (2001)). There are tangible benefits when the exchange 
rate regime matches the currency structure of trade and debt. Frankel and Rose (2002) estimate that belonging 
to a currency union triples trade. Empirical work by Devereux and Lane (2001b) shows the link between the 
exchange rate regime and the currency structure of debt in developing countries. Using cross-section data, 
they find that bilateral exchange rate volatility is strongly negatively affected by the stock of net bilateral -5- 
debt. In other words, governments tend to stabilize bilateral exchange rates with countries in whose currencies 
they tend to borrow. 
The currency structure of trade, the currency structure of debt, and the exchange rate regime are all 
endogenous to each other. It is a chicken-and-egg issue. They are all jointly determined in equilibrium. 
However, in this paper I will model the government as setting the optimal exchange rate regime in response to 
fixed and exogenous currency structure of trade and debt. Governments often have imperfect (if any) control 
over the currency structure of trade and debt. Those are either chosen by the private sector or imposed by 
world markets, and are often subject to network externalities and inertia. What domestic governments can and 
do control, however, is the exchange rate regime. 
Frankel and Wei (1994) used weekly exchange rate data for 1979-1992 to show that all of emerging 
East Asia was on a de facto dollar peg, in the sense that weights on the dollar were estimated to be above 90% 
and highly statistically significant for most countries and sub-periods. Moreover, using daily data for the 
period February 1994 – April 2002, McKinnon and Schnabl (2002) showed that, post-crisis, all of these 
economies (except Indonesia) have returned to their pre-crisis dollar pegs. 
Arguments in favor of baskets pegs typically stress the direction of trade of emerging East Asian 
countries. If we look at the direction of trade of nine emerging East Asian countries
4 in 2001, 20% of their 
exports went to the US, 12% went to Japan, and 30% went to the rest of the world (mostly the EU). Thirteen 
percent of their imports came from the US, 16% came from Japan, and 29% came from the rest of the world. 
Based on these numbers, many economists have recommended a trade-weighted basket with roughly equal 
weights on the dollar, yen, and euro. 
There are three major problems with this policy recommendation. First, I believe we should look not 
at the direction of trade but at the currency structure of trade. According to McKinnon and Schnabl (2002), 
74% of East Asian exports to Japan and 50% of imports from Japan in the year 2000 were invoiced in US 
dollars, while the rest was yen-invoiced. 
Second, the trade shares above omit intraregional trade among the nine East Asian countries – 37% of 
their exports and 42% of their imports are with each other. According to McKinnon (2000), intraregional 
trade is heavily dollarized, as is trade with the US. Taking all these adjustments into account, we can infer 
that at least 66% of exports and 63% of imports by East Asian countries are dollar-invoiced. Only about 3% 
of exports and 8% of imports are invoiced in yen.
5 In other words, East Asian trade is overwhelmingly 
                                                 
4 Defined to include China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand. All 
numbers come from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
5 The argument here is indirect because data on trade invoicing is unavailable. Direct evidence on invoicing is available for 
Korea only. According to McKinnon and Schnabl (2002), 85% of Korean exports and 80% of Korean imports in the year -6- 
dollarized and the yen plays a rather insignificant role. A basket with equal weights on the dollar, yen, and 
euro makes no sense then. The basket should reflect the dollar’s pre-eminence in the currency structure of 
East Asia’s trade. 
Third, the currency structure of debt tips the scales further in favor of the dollar (see Table 1). Note 
the remarkable build-up in dollar-denominated debt between 1996 and 2001: from an unweighted average of 
38% in 1996 to 60% in 2001. Back in pre-crisis 1996 all five countries were on de facto dollar pegs but were 
borrowing a lot (too much?) in other currencies. This must have caused some macroeconomic discomfort due 
to balance sheet effects, as my theoretical model will illustrate. In 2001, East Asian countries had largely 
returned to dollar pegging but had also started borrowing more in dollars, consistent with their exchange rate 
policies. 
In addition, there is evidence that developing countries are either unable or choose not to hedge 
foreign borrowing.
6 Unhedged foreign borrowing by the private sector plays a crucial role in generating the 
balance sheet effects in the model of Section 3. Given that the bulk of foreign borrowing in emerging East 
Asia is dollar-denominated and unhedged, that gives an extra reason to key on dollar. Financial market 
imperfections and incompleteness are the reason why the currency structure of debt matters so much for the 
exchange rate regime. 
 
2.2 The yen-dollar exchange rate and the real economy 
Kwan (2001) has outlined four plausible transmission channels through which fluctuations in the yen-
dollar exchange rate can have short-run cyclical effects on emerging East Asian economies. Since most of 
them practiced informal dollar pegs before 1997, a yen depreciation against the dollar translated into an 
appreciation of East Asian currencies against the yen, in lockstep with the dollar. First, a yen depreciation 
against the dollar reduces foreign direct investment into East Asia since the region’s cost advantages vis-à-vis 
Japan diminish. Second, a yen depreciation causes a loss of trade competitiveness vis-à-vis Japan. Third, a 
yen depreciation lowers the domestic currency price of intermediate goods imported from Japan and that 
means lower input prices and higher profits for domestic producers. Finally, a yen depreciation eases the 
burden of servicing yen-denominated debt by reducing the ex post real rate of interest. 
Note that the first and second channels have a contractionary effect on emerging East Asian 
economies, while the third and fourth ones should be expansionary. Which set of channels prevails in reality 
is an empirical question. Kwan (2001) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2002) have found that yen depreciations 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2000 were invoiced in dollars. Only 5% of exports and 12% of imports were invoiced in yen. Shares of other currencies were 
miniscule. This reinforces the point that trade in East Asia is largely dollarized. 
6 See the ongoing debate on Ricardo Hausmann’s concept of “original sin.” -7- 
cause a cyclical downturn in the region. The model in Section 3 incorporates the second, third, and fourth 
transmission channels discussed above. 
 
3. The model 
A seminal contribution by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) offered a tractable way of merging 
the business cycle literature with that on credit market imperfections. Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000) 
and Devereux and Lane (2001a, 2001b) have applied this framework to small open economy models. The 
central issue in these papers is the optimal monetary policy for a small open economy, in particular, the time-
honored question of whether the exchange rate should be fixed or floating. While I follow these contributions 
in using many of the same building blocks, this paper moves past the issue of “fix or float?” and on to the 
next stage by asking the question “fix to what?” The model’s answer is that when choosing the optimal basket 
of yen and dollar for small East Asian countries, we need to take into account not only the currency structure 
of trade but also the currency structure of debt, because of financial markets imperfections and 
incompleteness. For small East Asian countries, an additional reason to put a very high weight on the dollar is 
given by the fact that most foreign borrowing is dollar-denominated and unhedged. 
In the model, there are three countries in the world: two large economies A and B (think of the US 
and Japan) and a small open economy in East Asia (which I will call “Home”). The relative sizes of countries 
A and B will be γ and 1-γ, respectively. One could also think of A and B as a “dollar area” and a “yen area” in 
the sense that the dollar or the yen is the dominant currency for invoicing trade flows.
7 Nominal exchange 
rates (in units of Home’s currency per one unit of foreign currency) will be denoted by St
A and St
B. By 




BA is the exchange rate between B’s and A’s currencies 
(“yen per dollar”). 
In the small open economy, domestically-owned retailers import a good from A and another good 
from B. They combine, differentiate, and re-sell imports to domestic households and to entrepreneurs. 
Households consume imports and supply labor. Entrepreneurs consume some imports and sell the rest to 
domestic firms, who use them as productive capital. Domestic firms produce a couple of goods out of labor 
and capital, and export all output to A or B. None is consumed domestically. Figure 2 summarizes the flow of 
goods in the small open economy. 
                                                 
7 I do not distinguish between direction of trade and currency structure of trade – they are the same thing in the model. 
However, it is important to note once again that while the US is not important in East Asia’s direction of trade, the US dollar 
dominates the currency structure of trade of East Asian emerging economies. That dominance provides the primary 
justification for the soft pegs to the dollar East Asian countries practiced before the 1997 crisis. -8- 
The only source of uncertainty in the model is the yen-dollar exchange rate St
BA. There are no other 
sources of uncertainty in the model. In particular, there are no domestic nominal shocks. Therefore, unlike 
most small open economy models, domestic monetary control is not at issue here. I do not consider a kitchen 
sink of other possible exogenous shocks, since I am singularly interested in the impact of G-3 exchange rate 
volatility on small open economies, and in particular in the impact of yen-dollar volatility on emerging East 
Asia. 
The model has the features necessary to generate both the “good” and “bad” aspects of exchange rate 
depreciations. The “good” side of depreciations comes from the mercantile effect they have on domestic 
exports, output, and consumption. The “bad” side of depreciations is due to higher domestic prices of imports 
and to volatility-enhancing balance sheet effects on capital investment and future output. These three features 
can be traced back to the transmission channels identified in Section 2.2. 
All the action in the model is generated by instability in St
BA combined with financial market 
incompleteness and imperfect pass-through to the domestic price level. In particular, incomplete exchange 
rate pass-through makes balance sheet effects more dangerous. One can think of imperfect pass-through as a 
form of price stickiness, which is addressed by monetary policy in the model below. Devereux and Lane 
(2001a) have found that financial frictions generate an amplification effect to shocks, without altering the 
welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules for a small open economy. In contrast, in the model 
below financial market imperfections not only amplify shocks but also affect the choice of the optimal 
exchange rate regime. 
I consider two versions of the model, and the paper’s punchline hangs in the difference between the 
two. First, I consider a version of the model without any financial market imperfections. It turns out that 
under this condition, the optimal exchange rate regime is the trade-weighted basket. It is optimal to use the 
trade shares γ and 1-γ as basket shares on the dollar and yen, respectively. A trade-weighted basket will 
completely stabilize domestic prices, output, and consumption. 
Second, I consider a version of the model with credit market imperfections. Now, entrepreneurs 
finance purchases of imports (for capital investment and consumption) out of their own net worth and out of 
unhedged foreign borrowing in dollars. There is an interest rate premium on dollar debt, which is increasing 
in entrepreneurial leverage. These frictions amplify the impact of yen-dollar shocks on the small open 
economy. Furthermore, they also affect the optimal exchange rate regime. The trade-weighted basket is no 
longer optimal. Instead, it is now optimal to place a weight on the dollar which far exceeds γ, the dollar’s 
trade share. Even if there is no trade at all in dollars, it is still optimal to put a sizeable weight on it. Financial 
market imperfections and unhedged dollar borrowing in East Asia pull the optimal policy away from a trade--9- 
weighted basket, and toward putting a much greater weight on the currency in which foreign debt is 
denominated. 
Having broadly outlined the model, I now proceed to the detailed setup and analysis. In Home, there 
are households, retailers, exporting firms, a government, and entrepreneurs. I discuss each sector in turn. 
 
3.1 Households 
Households consume and supply labor to firms. Their utility function over consumption and effort is: 
































B denote labor supplied to the two types of firms who export to A and B, respectively. κ is the 
disutility of effort parameter. The disutility from labor supplied to the two types of firms is weighted in a very 
particular way in order to generate a steady-state direction of trade in which a fraction γ of exports will go to 
country A and 1-γ will go to B. Ct is an index of differentiated goods (which households purchase from 
monopolistically competitive retailers) and is given by: 
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The elasticity of substitution between brands is given by υ. Following standard Dixit-Stiglitz math, demand 
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Households do not have access to financial markets and must spend all of their labor and dividend income 









t t t L W L W C P Π + + = ,          (2) 
where 
i
t W  is the nominal wage paid in sector i (i = A, B), and Πt denotes lump-sum dividends from retailers. 
A wage differential between the two sectors is necessary to compensate households for the varying disutility 
of effort in each sector. The household’s allocation problem is a static one. Households play a passive role in 
this model – that is why the household sector is modeled as simply as possible. Typically, other authors have 
assumed that households either have access to complete financial markets or are completely shut off from -10- 
them (as is the case here). Both assumptions are unrealistic; the latter is simply more tractable. The same 
assumption is employed in Krugman (1999), Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000), and Devereux and Lane 
(2001b). The first-order conditions guiding labor-leisure choice as well the allocation of effort between the 
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3.2 Retailers 
Retailers are monopolistically competitive and are owned by the households. They purchase imports 
from both countries A and B and assemble them costlessly to produce a brand of the consumption good, using 
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t ,          (4) 
where Ct
A(z) and Ct
B(z) denote imports of homogenous goods from countries A and B used in the production 
of brand z. Note that the weights above coincide with the relative sizes of the two large countries. Once again, 
this will generate a steady-state direction of trade under which a fraction γ of imports will come from country 
A. By solving a standard expenditure minimization problem, we can derive retailers’ nominal marginal cost 
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where M
A and M
B are the foreign-currency prices of imports. Note that the nominal marginal cost equation 
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t ≡ ˆ  denotes percentage deviation from the constant steady state. A retailer’s choice of inputs 




































The last term above is a time-varying real exchange rate. An increase in S
BA, combined with sticky M
B and 
M
A, would amount to a depreciation (both nominal and real) of the yen against the dollar and will relocate 
retailers’ demand for imports from dollar-invoiced toward yen-invoiced goods. 
In modeling retailers’ price-setting decisions, I follow the tradition of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). 
Retailers update their prices infrequently. Independently of past history, each period a fraction 1-ϕ of them -11- 
gets a chance to adjust prices. Due to the law of large numbers, there is no aggregate uncertainty or income 
uncertainty for the representative household. The consumer price index Pt will evolve according to: 
() () []
υ υ υ ϕ ϕ
− − −






t t t P P P  
In log-linear terms, the equation becomes: 
new
t t t P P P ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ
1 ϕ ϕ − + = −         (7) 
A profit-maximizing retailer can be shown to follow a log-linear price-setting equation whose derivation is 
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where  t MC
∧
 is given by (6). If prices are completely flexible (ϕ=0), retailers will set prices according to the 
standard static monopolistic pricing condition: 
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, and hence to 
nominal marginal cost, pass-through will be low in the very first period, but will reach unity eventually. This 
is consistent with the evidence on ERPT in developing countries reported in Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) 
and in Choudhri and Hakura (2001). If Home unilaterally devalues its currency vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
(that is, it increases both St
A and St
B by the same percentage amounts), its domestic price level will increase 
proportionately in the long run. Imperfect short-run pass-through is crucial in generating the model’s results. 
If ERPT were instantaneously unity, the impact of shocks to St
BA on Home will be completely independent of 
the exchange rate regime, as I show in Section 4. In other words, the exchange rate regime would be 
irrelevant at the macroeconomic level.
8 This is just a special case of nominal neutrality when prices are 
completely flexible. The behavior of St
A and St
B will depend on Home’s exchange rate regime. Below I will 
assume that the government sets St
A and St
B as simple functions of St
BA. 
Retailers’ profits each period are given by the equation: 
Πt = (Pt - MCt)(Ct + Kt)         (11) 
                                                 
8 However, the exchange rate regime still matters in its microeconomic consequences. -12- 
Note that equation (11) keeps track of the profits retailers generate from selling to both households 
and entrepreneurs. I will assume that M
A and M
B are affected by volatility in the yen-dollar exchange rate S
BA, 
according to the following set of (log-linear) forward-looking equations: 
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The persistence parameter ϕ will be calibrated to a value close to unity to capture the idea that both prices are 
sticky in the producer’s currency and are relatively unaffected by shocks to St
BA in the short run. This is 
consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) and Choudhri and Hakura 
(2001) that pass-through to domestic prices in large closed industrialized economies is very close to zero, 
especially in the short run. Therefore, shocks to St
BA will cause substantial fluctuations in the relative prices of 
traded goods from countries A and B at shorter horizons. Engel (1999) has documented persuasively that 
most of the volatility in real exchange rates among industrialized countries is accounted for by fluctuations in 
the relative prices of traded goods. These fluctuations, in turn, are largely driven by a combination of sticky 
prices and volatile exchange rates. 
According to equations (12)-(13), in the very long run domestic prices will adjust to restore the real 
exchange rate to its equilibrium level. The division of “effort” between the two price levels will be according 
to the relative sizes of countries A and B. For example, if the yen permanently depreciates against the dollar 
by 1%, then dollar (country A) prices will eventually fall by 1-γ percent, while yen (country B) prices will 
eventually rise by γ percent. 
 
3.3 Exporting firms 
Domestic exporters to both A and B purchase labor from households and capital from entrepreneurs 
in order to produce their export good, according to identical CRS technologies: 
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I assume that capital depreciates completely each period. Domestic firms are competitive price-takers in 
world markets. Prices in dollars and yen for Home’s exports goods are denoted by X
A and X
B, respectively. 
These prices will be affected by fluctuations in the yen-dollar exchange rate similarly to the prices of 
imported goods: 
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A firm solves the following problem: 
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Rt denotes the nominal price of capital, which is completely mobile between sectors. The first-order 
conditions are standard: 
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3.4 Government 
The government’s only role in this model is to set the two exchange rates St
A and St
B as functions of 
St
BA. I allow for a continuum of exchange rate regimes which can be generalized as a basket peg with weights 
ω and 1-ω on the dollar and the yen, respectively: 
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t S S . By varying ω, we get the 
following three special cases: 
1.  A yen peg (ω=0): St
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2.  A dollar peg (ω=1): St
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The table below summarizes the behavior of the percentage deviations from the constant steady state of the 
two bilateral exchange rates and of the nominal effective exchange rate, as functions of the yen-dollar 
exchange rate, under the three exchange rate regimes defined above: -14- 
 
Exchange rate regime Yen peg Basket peg  Dollar peg 
ω = 0  γ  1 
Home’s exchange rate with A 
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t S S ˆ 1 ˆ γ γ − + . A quick look at equations (6) and (10) shows that we can also think of the trade-
weighted basket peg as a policy of targeting nominal marginal cost MCt and hence the domestic consumer 
price index Pt. 
As you might notice, nominal money balances do not enter the representative household’s utility 
function nor its budget constraint. In other words, money in this model is non-distortionary and exists simply 
as a unit of account. The model does not have a demand function for real money balances. Monetary policy is 
specified in terms of simple policy rules. This is a common modeling strategy in the recent literature on 
optimal monetary policy – papers include Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), Cespedes, Chang, and 
Velasco (2000), Gali and Monacelli (2002), and Devereux and Lane (2001b). 
Furthermore, the set of monetary regimes considered in this paper is restricted to a continuum of 
exchange rate pegs. The paper does not consider inflation-targeting or targeting short-term nominal interest 
rates or the money supply.
9 The large literature on “fear of floating” started by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) has 
demonstrated persuasively that the monetary authorities in emerging markets tend to focus on the exchange 
rate as their preferred tool for conducting monetary policy. 
 
4. Entrepreneurs, equilibrium, and the optimal exchange rate regime without net worth 
constraints 
Recall that I consider two variations of the model. This section analyzes a version of the model 
without any financial market imperfections in the entrepreneurial sector. In Section 5 I set up and solve a 
version of the model with net worth constraints in the entrepreneurial sector. The paper’s punchline hangs in 
the difference between the two equilibria. 
Here, entrepreneurs buy re-packaged imports from retailers and re-sell these imports to firms, which 
then use them as capital in producing exports. Capital is completely fungible with the composite consumption 
                                                 
9 However, as pointed out earlier, the trade-weighted basket peg could be considered as targeting the domestic price level. -15- 
good (see equation (4)) and therefore the purchase price entrepreneurs pay is Pt. For now, I will assume away 
any frictions. Entrepreneurs simply re-sell to firms and make zero profits in the process:  t t P R = . 
A quick discussion is in order for the constant steady-state solution of the model described by 
equations (2)-(3), (9), (11), (14), and (17)-(18), assuming that in steady state we have S
i = M
i = X
i = 1, for i = 
A, B, without loss of generality. The exogenous cost of capital will equalize the capital-labor ratios in both 
exporting sectors. That, in turn, will make sure that wages in both sectors will also be equal. Finally, equation 





. Due to equal capital-labor ratios and constant-returns-to-scale technologies in the two sectors, 




. In other words, in the constant steady 
state, a fraction γ of output gets exported to country A and a fraction 1-γ gets exported to B. 
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It is easier to analyze the model, as described in equations (2)-(3), (11), (14), and (17)-(18), in log-
linear form: 
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where 
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i, Π, C. On the other hand, MC and P are set 
according to equations (6) and (10). The dynamics of 
i
t M ˆ  and 
i
t X ˆ  are given by equations (12)-(13) and (15)-
(16). The government sets the exchange rates S
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γ γ  is the export price index. I also repeatedly substituted for 
t MC
∧








t M M ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ γ γ − +  will not be affected by shocks to S
BA. 
Equation (19) is one of the crucial equations of the model. It illustrates the “competitiveness channel” 




t S S ˆ 1 ˆ γ γ − + . When the nominal effective 




t S S ˆ 1 ˆ γ γ − +  rises relative to  t P ˆ , Home’s output is up, according to equation (19). 
First, note that if exchange rate pass-through were instantaneously unity and the price level P always 
moved in lockstep with the nominal effective exchange rate and with marginal cost, then shocks to St
BA would 
have no impact whatsoever on Home, regardless of the exchange rate regime. In other words, the exchange 
rate regime would be irrelevant at the macroeconomic level. 
Second, with incomplete pass-through, it is easy to see that a trade-weighted basket peg (with ω=γ) 
will completely stabilize output and all other variables of the system. Therefore, in the context of this simple 
model without financial market imperfections in the entrepreneurial sector, the trade-weighted basket peg is 
the optimal monetary policy. Of course, the model is deliberately stacked in order to generate this result when 
there are no financial market imperfections. It produces a benchmark against which to compare the results 
from Section 5. The key point is that net worth constraints in the entrepreneurial sector will pull away from 
the trade-weighted basket and toward a greater weight on the foreign currency in which entrepreneurial debt 
is denominated. 
Under a yen peg (ω=0), a depreciation of the yen against the dollar (St
BA↑) causes a depreciation in 
Home’s nominal effective exchange rate, and, by equation (19), a jump in real output. Capital, labor, and 
consumption all go up as well. A depreciation has an expansionary mercantile effect on the economy, 
consistent with the empirical results in Kwan (2001) and in McKinnon and Schnabl (2002). Under a dollar 
peg (ω=1), a yen depreciation has the exact opposite effects – a nominal effective appreciation leads to 
contraction in real output and all other domestic variables. 
 
5. Entrepreneurs, equilibrium, and the optimal exchange rate regime with net worth constraints 
Next, I set up and solve a version of the model in which there are balance sheet effects generated by 
net worth constraints on entrepreneurs. 
 -18- 
5.1 Setup of the entrepreneurial sector and equilibrium 
Entrepreneurs play a crucial role here. They purchase the index consumption good at a price Pt from 
retailers and re-sell it to firms at price Rt. Firms use it as capital in producing exports. Now capital purchases 
are financed by entrepreneurs’ net worth and by their borrowing in A’s currency (dollars). Entrepreneurs are 
either forced or choose to borrow in dollars and take on unhedged foreign currency debt.
10 Dollars-only 
foreign borrowing is an institutional constraint on the model which captures the role of the dollar as 
“international money,” especially in international capital flows in East Asia. 
At the end of each period t, entrepreneurs combine their nominal net worth Nt with dollar-
denominated borrowing Bt+1 to finance purchases of imports which will be used in next period’s production of 
exports by firms: 
  1 1 + + = + t t t
A
t t K P B S N , where 
B A K K K + ≡        (20) 
As a result of this timing convention, equation (11) should be modified slightly to: 
Πt = (Pt - MCt)(Ct + Kt+1)         (11-A) 
The gross interest rate on Bt is (1+i
*)(1+ρt+1), where i
* is the exogenous and constant world interest rate, and 
ρt+1 is a risk premium which is increasing in the entrepreneur’s leverage: 
  0 , 1
1














         (21) 
Lenders charge a higher risk premium when they observe that a lower fraction of capital investment is 
financed out of own net worth. The higher the entrepreneurs’ debt-to-equity ratio, the less they have at stake 
and the more likely they are to default on the loan. Above, ρt+1 = 0 when PtKt+1 = Nt, that is, when investment 
is entirely financed out of net worth. Kt+1 and ρt+1 are part of time t’s information set. It is important to state 
that I will only consider small temporary shocks to St
BA, in order to rule out a scenario in which Nt falls to zero 
and ρt explodes to infinity. 
At the beginning of each period, after observing the realization of St
BA, entrepreneurs receive payment 
RtKt from firms for the services of capital that entrepreneurs secured for them at the end of t-1. They also 
repay the dollar debt they incurred at t-1. Finally, they consume a fraction 1-δ of their net income. 
Entrepreneurs consume the same index of differentiated goods as households – see equations (1) and (4). 
Their net worth is then given by: 
  ( ) t
A
t t t t t B S i K R N ) 1 )( 1 (
* ρ δ + + − =         (22) 
Equation (22) shows that, ceteris paribus, a depreciation against the dollar will increase the ex post debt 
burden, reduce entrepreneurial net worth and, thus, reduce future investment. It is another key equation of the 
                                                 
10 See the debate on “original sin” which started with Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). -19- 
model (in addition to (19)) since it generates the “balance sheet channel” which provides the rationale for 
paying more attention to the dollar exchange rate than was the case in Section 4 with the frictionless 
entrepreneurial sector. 
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral. Free entry in the entrepreneurial sector will ensure that 
entrepreneurs will equate return on capital investment to the external cost of funds, both in dollar terms: 






















































ρ ρ      (23) 
A closer look would reveal that the above arbitrage condition is really a special case of uncovered interest 
parity. The setup of the entrepreneurial sector is standard in the literature started by Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1998). Since the currency structure of debt and the debt-to-equity ratio matter in this model, we 
have a failure f the Modigliani-Miller theorem. 
In order to find the economy-wide current account equation (in dollar terms), use (22) to substitute for 









t, and rearrange. The result is: 
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Note that Bt denotes foreign debt, not foreign assets. 
Using equations (2)-(3), (9), (11-A), (14), (17)-(18), (20)-(23) we can compute the flex-price constant 




i, P, Π, C, R, N, B, ρ as functions of all the other 
parameters of the model, under the assumption that S
i = M
i= X
i = 1, for i = A, B. The solutions for the 
constant steady state are deferred to the Appendix. Note that in the constant steady state we have 
( )() 1 1 1
* = + + ρ δ i  and Bt+1 = Bt. It then follows from equation (24) above that trade is balanced in the steady 
state. However, the constant steady-state level of debt is non-zero (positive) because entrepreneurs must 
borrow each period (including the initial one) in order to finance investment into next period’s capital stock. 
The Appendix also offers the equations of the log-linearized system and describes the solution method for the 
model, which is along the lines of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). 
 
5.2 The optimal exchange rate regime with net worth constraints 
This section simulates numerically the log-linear model solved in the Appendix. The time unit of the 
model is one quarter. I set α to 0.35, the consensus value in the business cycle literature. The monopolistic 
pricing parameter υ is set to 6. I set the price stickiness parameter ϕ to 0.75, also a standard value. Setting -20- 
i
*=0.01 implies a per annum world interest rate of 4%, which is also common. Correspondingly, I set β=0.99. 
Combining i
* with a value of 0.985 for δ implies a steady-state risk premium of 200 basis points per annum, 
as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998). Finally, I set µ to 0.0075 in order to obtain a steady-state debt-
to-equity ratio of unity. The steady-state debt-to-output ratio is then around 0.17. 
The behavior of  t MC
∧
 and  t P ˆ  is pinned down by equations (6) and (10). The dynamics of 
i
t M ˆ  and 
i
t X ˆ  
are given by equations (12)-(13) and (15)-(16). The behavior of 
i
t S ˆ  was described in Section 3.4. 
Now suppose that the yen depreciates against the dollar by 10% (S
BA jumps up from 1 to 1.1). The 
shock is temporary and gradually fades away. Figures 3 through 5 describe the response of the system to this 
shock under the three alternative exchange rate regimes outlined in Section 3.4. The simulation assumes the 
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Note that a yen depreciation is expansionary under a yen peg and contractionary under a dollar peg 
(Figures 3 and 5). Thus, my theoretical model is consistent with the empirical results reported in Bleakley and 
Cowan (2002). That paper dismissed the claim that dollar debt and balance sheet effects make depreciations 
against the dollar contractionary. In the model here, depreciations against the dollar are not contractionary – 
they amplify the expansions instead. Currency mismatches play an amplification role – the cyclical effect 
when there are currency mismatches (yen peg) is sharper than when there are none (dollar peg). The dollar 
price of investment goods (P/S
A) plays an important role in the amplification mechanism. Under a dollar peg, 
it stays largely unchanged, due to slow pass-through. Under a yen peg it falls, due to the increase in S
A 
relative to P. Since purchases of imports for capital investment are partially financed by dollar borrowing, the 
drop in (P/S
A) makes it cheaper, in dollar terms, for entrepreneurs to buy investment goods. 
As a next step, the log-linear model was simulated for a large number of periods, with an AR(1) 
stochastic process for 
BA
t S ˆ : 
1 1 ˆ ˆ




t u S S η ,   η = 0.5,    ut+1 ∼ N(0,1) 
Obviously, St
BA is a stationary variable here: it always reverts to its constant steady-state level. Since I am 
concerned with deviations from the steady state, I do not model drift in the steady-state value of St
BA. One 
should think of the standard deviations of all other variables computed below as measured relative to the 
standard deviation of 
BA
t S ˆ , since St
BA is the model’s only source of uncertainty and the standard deviation of -21- 
ut+1 is normalized to 1. I pick an intermediate value for η. Later, I will explore the sensitivity of the results to 
the value of the persistence parameter. 
Figure 6 plots the standard deviations of consumption and output as functions of the trade share with 
the US, under the three exchange rate regimes considered earlier in Section 3.4: a yen peg, a dollar peg, or a 
trade-weighted basket (ω=γ). The trade-weighted basket is superior to a single-currency peg for any value of 
γ. However, there could be reasons, not captured in this model, why single-currency pegs might be preferable 
to basket pegs. Single-currency pegs are easier to administer and offer higher transparency and credibility 
relative to baskets. Basket pegs reduce the microeconomic and informational benefits of pegging (Mussa et al 
(2000)). Also, basket pegs involve some degree of exchange rate volatility against all currencies in the basket 
and this might discourage trade and investment flows, per Frankel and Rose (2002). Furthermore, note how 
close a dollar peg is to the trade-weighted basket in terms of minimizing consumption volatility. 
If we restrict our attention to single-currency pegs, an interesting result arises (see Figure 6): if the 
share of trade in dollars exceeds 7%, a dollar peg is superior to a yen peg, if the policymaker’s objective is to 
minimize consumption volatility. For output volatility, that threshold value is 31%. Credit market 
imperfections and unhedged foreign borrowing create an asymmetry in favor of the currency of debt 
denomination. As discussed in Section 2.1 above, two-thirds of the foreign trade of the typical emerging East 
Asian economy is invoiced in dollars. For γ = 0.65 in Figure 6, a dollar peg is vastly superior to a yen peg. 
Furthermore, the difference between a dollar peg and a trade-weighted basket is negligible. 
Next, Figure 7 plots the optimal weight on the dollar ω
* as a function of γ, the share of Home’s trade 
in dollars. That is, I no longer restrict ω to the three values analyzed earlier – (0, γ, 1) – but instead I consider 
the entire interval [0,1]. When there are no financial market imperfections in the entrepreneurial sector (as in 
Section 4), the mapping from γ to ω
* is simply the 45° line. The lines above the 45° line give the values of ω 
(for each value of γ) which minimize consumption and output volatility, respectively, in the model with credit 
constraints. Even if there is no trade in dollars whatsoever, it is optimal to put a weight of 47% on dollars in 
order to minimize consumption volatility! For output volatility, the optimal weight is 27% even if there is no 
trade in dollars. More generally, these weights are much higher than the dollar’s trade share. Due to net worth 
constraints and unhedged dollar borrowing in the entrepreneurial sector, it is optimal to place a higher weight 
on the dollar than the one suggested by the frictionless model studied in Section 4. For an emerging East 
Asian economy in which the fraction γ of dollar-invoiced trade is about 65%, the optimal weight on the dollar 
would be in the vicinity of 75-80%. This is very close to the actual weights estimated for the pre-crisis period 
by Frankel and Wei (1994). 
Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the considerable sensitivity of these results to the value of the 
persistence parameter η. It assumes that γ = 0; that is, it takes the extreme case when there is no trade -22- 
in dollars. (In the model of Section 4, the optimal value on the dollar would have been zero.) I then plot 
the optimal weight on dollars as a function of the persistence of the exchange rate shock. Note that for 
very low values of the persistence parameter, the optimal weight on the dollar is very high – around 
100% for consumption volatility, and around 60% for output volatility. As persistence increases, the 
optimal weight on A’s currency declines and, for very high values of η, it is quite close to zero for both 
consumption and output volatility. Intuitively, when η is high, the innovations to the yen-dollar rate are 
small relative to the existing deviation from the steady state. As a result, balance sheet effects are 
relatively less important and there is no reason to pay particular attention to the dollar exchange rate. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the choice of an exchange rate regime by small open economies facing G-3 
monetary instability is complicated by credit market imperfections involving unhedged foreign borrowing and 
net worth constraints. In general, these frictions pull the optimal policy away from the trade-weighted basket, 
and toward putting a greater weight on the currency in which foreign debt is denominated. In particular, East 
Asian economies should continue keying on the dollar, not only because the bulk of their trade is invoiced in 
dollars, but also because most of their foreign debt is dollar-denominated and unhedged. 
This paper has argued in favor of a basket which places a very high weight on the dollar (and some 
small weight on the Japanese yen). It is possible to go one step further and argue in favor of a pure peg to the 
dollar. First, basket pegs are confusing because they involve some volatility against all currencies in the 
basket. The average cab driver on the streets of Bangkok will be hopelessly confused. A second (and related) 
point is that basket pegs have transparency and credibility problems. The cab driver might question the 
credibility of the monetary authority’s claim that exchange rate policy is guided by rules rather than 
discretion, especially when the composition and weights of the basket are kept secret, as was the case in many 
East Asian countries before the 1997 crisis. Single-currency pegs are more transparent and therefore more 
credible. Third, recent empirical work decisively establishes that exchange rate volatility discourages foreign 
trade (Frankel and Rose (2002)). In particular, their empirical work has shown that the benefits of reduced 
exchange rate volatility, in terms of trade flows, are small compared to a currency union. A basket peg 
involves some limited volatility against all currencies in the basket. Therefore, it is inferior to a single-
currency peg in terms of its effect on trade flows. Fourth and final, Figure 6 illustrates that a dollar peg comes 
very close indeed to a trade-weighted basket as way to minimize macroeconomic instability. -23- 
APPENDIX 
 
A. Steady state for the model with credit market imperfections 




i = 1, for i = A, B, and is given by: 
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Note that we need 1/δ > 1+i
* in order to have ρ > 0 in steady state. Note also that the steady-state gross 
markup R/P charged by entrepreneurs to firms equals the inverse of entrepreneurs’ saving rate. 
 -24- 
B. The log-linear model and its solution 
Next, I log-linearize equations (2)-(3), (11-A), (14), (17)-(18), (20)-(23) around the constant steady 
state: 
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t t . MC and P are set according to 
equations (6) and (10). The dynamics of 
i
t M ˆ  and 
i
t X ˆ  are given by equations (12)-(13) and (15)-(16). The 
government sets the exchange rates S
i. In the above system,  , ˆ , ˆ
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For the remaining 3 variables – the rental price of capital R, net worth N, and the capital stock K – one 

















































, where  A is a (3x3) matrix and B is a (3x1) matrix, such that: 
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To solve this system, I followed the method outlined in Monacelli and Natalucci (2002), which is a simplified 
version of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Of the 3 eigen values I computed for matrix A, using the parameter 
values of Section 5.2, one is outside and two are inside the unit circle. Given that I have one unstable (R) and 
two stable (N and K) variables in the system, the solution is unique. 
 -26- 
C. Log-linearizing equation (23) 
Equation (23) is the hardest one to log-linearize because it contains the expectation of a non-linear 
function of two random variables on its left-hand side. Because of Jensen’s inequality, a first-order Taylor 
approximation is inappropriate. I use a trick from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 504), where they show how 
to linearize a stochastic Euler equation. 
The right-hand side is easy – just take logs to get: 
( ) ( ) 1
* 1 log 1 log log log + + + + + − t
A
t t i S P ρ  
For the left-hand side, assume that the random variable Rt+1/
A
t S 1 +  is lognormally distributed with a conditional 
variance which is constant over time. This is consistent with the assumption (adopted in Section 5.2) of 
Normal shocks to 
BA
t S ˆ . Then: 
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Take logs to get: 
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Since I am interested in the system’s dynamic response to shocks, and not in trend movements, I omit (as do 
Obstfeld and Rogoff) the constant variance term. In logs, equation (23) is approximated by: 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
*




t t t t i S P S E R E ρ  
Re-arrange to get: 
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Use the steady-state relationship: 
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Note that ρt+1 is not a random variable – it is pre-determined at time t. -27- 
REFERENCES 
 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1998. The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle 
framework. NBER Working Paper No. 6455. 
Blanchard, O., Kahn, C.M., 1980. The solution of linear difference models under rational expectations. 
Econometrica 48, 1305-1311. 
Bleakley, H., Cowan, K., 2002. Corporate dollar debt and devaluations: much ado about nothing? MIT, 
manuscript. 
Calvo, G.A., 1983. Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 
383-398. 
Calvo, G.A., Reinhart, C.M., 2002. Fear of floating. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 379-408. 
Cespedes, L.F., Chang, R., Velasco, A., 2000. Balance sheets and exchange rate policy. NBER Working 
Paper No. 7840. 
Choudhri, E.U., Hakura, D.S., 2001. Exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices: does the inflationary 
environment matter? IMF Working Paper WP/01/194. 
Devereux, M.B., Lane, P.R., 2001a. Exchange rates and monetary policy in emerging market economies. 
University of British Columbia, manuscript. 
Devereux, M.B., Lane, P.R., 2001b. Understanding bilateral exchange rate volatility. University of British 
Columbia, manuscript. 
Eichengreen, B., Hausmann, R., 1999. Exchange rates and financial fragility. NBER Working Paper No. 
7418. 
Engel, C., 1999. Accounting for U.S. real exchange rate changes. Journal of Political Economy 107, 507-538. 
Esquivel, G., Larrain, F., 2002. The impact of G-3 exchange rate volatility on developing countries. G-24 
Discussion Paper No. 16. 
Frankel, J.A., Rose, A.K., 2002. An estimate of the effect of common currencies on trade and income. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 437-466. 
Frankel, J.A., Wei, S.-J., 1994. Yen bloc or dollar bloc? Exchange rate policies of the East Asian economies, 
in: Ito, T., Krueger, A.O. (Eds.), Macroeconomic linkage: savings, exchange rates, and capital flows. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 295-329. 
Gali, J., Monacelli, T., 2002. Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy. NBER 
Working Paper No. 8905. 
Goldfajn, I., Werlang, S.R.C., 2000. The pass-through from depreciation to inflation: a panel study. PUC-Rio 
Working Paper. 
International Monetary Fund, 2003. World Economic Outlook: September 2003. IMF, Washington. -28- 
Ito, T., Ogawa, E., Sasaki, Y.N., 1998. How did the dollar peg fail in Asia? NBER Working Paper No. 6729. 
Kawai, M., 2002. Exchange rate arrangements in East Asia: lessons from the 1997-98 currency crisis. 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, manuscript. 
Krugman, P., 1999. Balance sheets, the transfer problem, and financial crises, in: Razin, A., Rose, A.K. 
(Eds.), International finance and financial crises: essays in honor of Robert P. Flood, Jr. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Norwell, pp. 31-44. 
Kwan, C.H., 2001. Yen bloc: toward economic integration in Asia. Brookings Institution Press, Washington. 
McKinnon, R.I., 2000. On the periphery of the international dollar standard: Canada versus Latin America 
versus East Asia. Stanford University Working Paper. 
McKinnon, R.I., 2001. The world dollar standard and the East Asian exchange rate dilemma. Economic 
Affairs Committee, House of Lords, London. 
McKinnon, R.I., Schnabl, G., 2002. Synchronized business cycles in East Asia: fluctuations in the yen/dollar 
exchange rate and China’s stabilizing role. Stanford University, manuscript. 
Monacelli, T., 2001. A dynamic neo-Keynesian model with imperfect competition. Boston College, 
manuscript. 
Monacelli, T., Natalucci, F., 2002. Solving non-singular systems of expectational difference equations: an 
application. NYU, manuscript. 
Mussa, M., Masson, P., Swoboda, A., Jadresic, E., Mauro, P., Berg, A., 2000. Exchange rate regimes in an 
increasingly integrated world economy. IMF Occasional Paper No. 193. 
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 1996. Foundations of international economics. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Reinhart, C.M., Reinhart, V.R., 2001. What hurts most? G-3 exchange rate or interest rate volatility. NBER 
Working Paper No. 8535. 
Turnovsky, S., 1982. A determination of the optimal currency basket: a macroeconomic analysis. Journal of 
International Economics 12, 333-354. 
Williamson, J., 2000. Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Markets: Reviving the Intermediate Option. 
Institute for International Economics, Washington. 
Yun, T., 1996. Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity, and business cycles. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 37, 345-370. -29- 
Table 1: Currency composition of long-term debt for the five East Asian economies (%) 
Country Currency  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001
Indonesia  JPY  35 36 36 38 38 35 35 33 32 36 33 28 
Korea  JPY  32 31 30 32 34 38 32 23 18 22 23 18 
Malaysia  JPY  37 36 35 38 38 35 28 27 30 30 28 23 
Philippines  JPY  31 34 35 38 40 40 38 37 38 39 38 34 
Thailand  JPY  43 45 47 50 51 48 45 39 40 46 46 44 
Indonesia  USD  21 19 20 20 20 22 24 27 48 47 50 57 
Korea  USD  33 39 45 46 39 39 48 60 73 72 70 76 
Malaysia  USD  32 30 28 29 35 49 56 56 59 60 63 71 
Philippines  USD  36 33 34 30 28 28 30 34 35 39 43 48 
Thailand  USD  16 18 22 22 23 27 32 47 49 45 46 49 
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Note: Before 1999, the euro-dollar exchange rate is spliced with the Deutsche mark-dollar rate. -30- 
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Figure 3: Impact of a 10% depreciation of the yen against the dollar under a yen peg 
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Figure 4: Impact of a 10% depreciation of the yen against the dollar under a trade-
weighted basket peg 
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Figure 5: Impact of a 10% depreciation of the yen against the dollar under a dollar 
peg 
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Figure 6: Consumption and output volatility as functions of the share of trade 
with the US under three exchange rate regimes 
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Figure 8: Optimal weight on the dollar as a function of the persistence in 
the exchange rate shock (γ=0) 
 